Writing for Horn Review, an Ethiopian thinktank, Ambassador Dina Mufti proposes a solution to the Eritrea-Ethiopia “conundrum” in the form of a “supranational union” modeled on the European Union, with four pillars: economic integration (e.g., customs union, Ethiopia’s access to Assab), a political council for dialogue, security and defense cooperation, and cultural-social ties. Before we talk about the solution he proposed–which magically bestows a “special deal” for Ethiopia on Eritrea’s Assab Port (of course)–let’s review what exactly the “conundrum” is between these two ancient people of the Horn.
- The Conundrum
Ambassador Dina Mufti is a Member of Parliament (MP) in Ethiopia’s House of People’s Representatives and a member of its Standing Committee on Foreign Relations and Peace Affairs. His previous roles included Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Director General of Public Diplomacy, and multiple ambassadorial roles to Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, etc. In case you are asking “why does that name sound familiar?”, it is because when he was with MoFA, he said:
“By the way, each and every Eritrean, they won’t be asked, but if they were, they [would admit that they] don’t celebrate the day they separated from Ethiopia. They don’t like it. The ones abroad confess it. Ethiopians also have the same feeling.”
He got a lot of pushback from Eritreans–not the Eritrean government which was perched on its “One People, Two Countries”, #NoMore, #GameOver kiosk–but from us in the Opposition, and the Ambassador apologized the same day he had repeated whatever nonsense he had heard from the Eritreans he met at whatever Segreto they were lamenting their independence in exile.
The conundrum, as the Ambassador sees it, is as follows: (a) Ethiopians and Eritreans are too alike and too intertwined in every aspect of life making “a completely separate existence virtually impossible.” Their cultural and social ties are so strong that they just can’t function as two normal neighbors; (b) the two countries cannot be unified, not even under confederation because Eritrea has developed a distinct identity, forged through Italian colonial rule, and a “long and bitter national liberation movement” which has solidified its commitment to sovereignty. The sacrifices it paid over the 30 long years of armed struggle create a strong resistance to any arrangement that appears to compromise its sovereignty.
About the conundrum. The claim that the cultural and social ties of Eritrea and Ethiopia are so strong they can’t function as two normal neighbors is true–from an Abyssinian Permanent Ruling Class perspective. There is more to Eritrea and Ethiopia than Tigrinya, Tigray, and Amhara. Otherwise, what exactly are the strong “social ties” between Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo, and Eritrea’s second largest ethnic group, the Tigre? What do a Somali Ethiopian and a Beja Eritrean have in common? What do the people of Southern and Southwestern Ethiopia have in common with the Semhar people of Eritrea?
If there is any “conundrum” in the Eritrea and Ethiopia relationship, it is that successive governments–Emperors, Communists and Prosperitarians– and even the Ethiopian Opposition–like Arbegnoch refuse to work on a State-State relationship and focus on Some People to Some People relationship. In one interview, Andargachew Tsige, the leader of Arbegnoch–and the gentlemen who allegedly was a liaison between Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki before their 2018-2020 Bromance–talked about how Eritreans and Ethiopians are identical people because when he was in Eritrea he was awakened by church bells and mothers wearing the traditional white shawls. To him, and people like him, that is the entirety of Eritrea, and the other half does not exist.
The conundrum that the ambassador speaks of–President Isaias Afwerki can’t stop from giving a running commentary on Ethiopia, acting like an Ethiopian opposition; and Ethiopia just can’t stop thinking about the Red Sea–are not national conundrums but politicians’ ambitions gone rogue. Change the politicians and you change the dynamic entirely.
Once one realizes the first half of the conundrum is mental humdrum, it is easy to see the second half is an arhythmic drum. What is so problematic about a country that worked hard to get its sovereignty and wants to guard it jealously? That’s just good ol’ ordinary Statehood.
2. The Proposal
Before the good Ambassador proposes his solutions to this non-existent conundrum, he does a fairly decent chronicle of the Eritrea-Ethiopia history since Federation: the Emperor’s dissolution of the Federation because he couldn’t reconcile Imperial Rule with the democratic values of the Eritrean Constitution of 1952; the Derg’s terroristic rule; the rise and fall of the relationship between EPLF and TPLF and its causes. He does throw in a poisonous word that contributes to the “conundrum”–Eritreans alleged sense of superiority–when a much more nuanced and obvious answer was available: EPLF felt superior to TPLF, in exactly the same way TPLF felt superior to the other satellites in EPRDF: it’s just about seniority and experience. The ambassador does not spend a lot of time telling us why the Eritrea Ethiopia Friendship Agreement of 2018 did not work and why, if port access was so critical to Ethiopia (as is now claimed) it was not even an item in the Agreement.
He does tell us that the Eritrean armed forces entered Ethiopia uninvited and picked which battles to fight on, which battles to avoid, and how much to loot and violate human rights. This is, of course, entirely different from what Ethiopia chronicled as the war was happening, but that’s just ordinary politics of ordinary politicians: absolve themselves of all sins and place it all on a former partner.
3. Supranational Union
Since we can’t be regular neighbors, and since Eritreans have this crazy obsession with sovereignty, and since Ethiopians have this never-quenched thirst for the Sea, why don’t we create a supranational union–like the European Union–where, on limited issues (like: Assab) we can have joint sovereignty, asks the ambassador. He even has some of the details worked out: like the Eritrea-Ethiopia Friendship Agreement of 2018, his proposal will have four pillars: economic integration (Ethiopia to have “special rights” or “exclusive rights” over Assab); political council (platform for policy coordination); Security & Defense (Joint counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and Red Sea anti-piracy efforts, leveraging both nations’ military capabilities) and Cultural & Social (youth exchanges and joint concerts, I think.) The Supranational Union would be modeled after the European Union.
Many years ago, I had a friend in the Eritrean government who used to have fun mocking us in the opposition for proposing ideas imported from the West that have no bearing to “our reality.” I think that is the main criticism here of the Ambassador’s proposal:
A. Sovereignty: Eritrea, like the rest of Africa, is not willing to give up the exclusive power to make decisions about Eritrea. This word is commonly referred to as sovereignty. This is why African Union doesn’t work, IGAD doesn’t work: African countries want to have the exclusive right to make decisions about their country.
B. Diverse Political System: The Ethiopian Emperor was right: it was impossible to marry the feudal system he ran, with a system that had democratic institutions. Where he made the mistake in making Eritrea more feudal, instead of making Ethiopia more democratic, as his Foreign Minister advised him to. The European Union example cannot work because the Europeans were all in agreement about the form of government: liberal democracy. In Africa, we don’t have two countries with the same system. Good or bad, the governing models in Eritrea and Ethiopia are vastly different, as are their priorities.
C. Economic Inequality: France and Germany’s path towards the European Union was, at first, single-focused: rebuilding their coal and steel industry. What industries would Eritrea and Ethiopia integrate?
D. Funding: Behind the success of the EU was the US and its Marshall Plan which, over four years, poured today’s equivalent of 150 billion USD to make the Union work. Who is going to do that for Eritrea and Ethiopia’s Supranational Union? UAE?
E. Weak Institutions: Neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia is renowned for its strong institutions. Which institutions, reporting to which office, reported by which media will make this supranational union work?
F. No Shared Vision: Eritrea will always need to establish strong relationships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Djibouti. Ethiopia considers some of these countries “historical enemies.” How is a Supranational Union supposed to address this?
4. The Solution
The only way to understand Ethiopia is to think of it as an empire which hasn’t come to terms with its decline. As long as Ethiopia doesn’t come to terms with the idea that, like many empires, what it used to possess now is not what it used to possess before, it will always have these Red Sea Pangs–a compulsion, an urge to take back something that was once yours. That is a conundrum that Ethiopia and Ethiopians will have to solve by and for themselves.
If all Ethiopia wants is a fair, reliable way to get access to the Sea, there are many neighboring nations, including Eritrea, that would compete to get its business. Unfortunately, when Ethiopia says “access”, it doesn’t mean “access” but a land corridor under its sovereignty and a place for its Navy to operate. That, as all its neighbors (not just Eritrea) have told it, is a non-starter because there are huge trust issues when it comes to a former empire that feels incomplete without OWNING a port.
Ethiopia is now doing its version of “One China” policy, petitioning every country to support its demand for “access to the Sea” and then listing all the countries that support its drive. This is Bad Faith Diplomacy, as the countries supporting its demand for access to the Sea may or may not support its demand for a land corridor and a naval base. Even if they do, it is Bad Faith Diplomacy to attempt to present a fait accompli to the country that owns the Sea which is being negotiated behind its back.
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