It’s hard to use two examples–that of Tamrat Negera and Teodros “Teddy” Tsegaye from Reyot stream— and to conclusively assert that there is a resurgence of Ethiopian ultranationalism but on the assumption that three broadcasts in less than 15 days mean something, it may be worth saying a word or two. Instead of drafting a rebuttal to the wrong choices espoused by Tamrat and Teddy–that would be polemical and redundant– I would like to frame this inside (and put it within context of) the debate that Africans have been having about the very meaning of “nationalism”, in their post-colonial world.
My favorite definition of nationalism and why it is necessary was put forth by Edward Said: “Nationalism resurgent, or even nationalism militant, whether it is the nationalism of the victim or of the victor, is the philosophy of identity made into a collectively organized passion. For those of us just emerging from marginality and persecution, nationalism is a necessary thing: a long deferred and denied identity needs to come out into the open and take its place among other human identities.” Notice that this definition doesn’t say that nationalism is rational; it just says it is a necessary philosophy, particularly for people long marginalized.
When I say Africans have been having this debate, I mean starting from one of Africa’s premiere intellectuals, Nyerere, all the way to Ethiopian and Eritrean intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s like Melaku Tegegn, Mesfin Araya, Osman Saleh Sabbe and Bereket Habteselasse, and down to all the Westerners who ended up taking the Ethiopian side (Pankhurst, Erlich, Henze) or Eritrean side (Trevaskis, Markakis, Lefort, Pateman) of the debate. So, not to burst the bubble of Tamrat and Teodros and all their fans, but this is a very old debate and, sadly, the two have added not a single new perspective to it. Unless attitude counts, in which case they have plenty, of the shock-jock variety.
What we have here, is what we always had: Ethiopian ultra-nationalists definition of nationalism and their dismissal of all other forms. To have nationalism, you must have a nation and, whether they know it or not, they accept the Stalin definition of it: “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” Using this definition, nationalism is something organic that evolves over a long period of time, maybe 3,000 or 4,000 years, and it includes mythologies, chronicles and unified rule. Very Old Country. In fact, they would argue: very Great Ethiopia, which certainly dates back to Axum civilization, with its port in Adulis, Eritrea. So not only does this conclusively demonstrate that Ethiopia is a genuine bonafide nation, but this nation included parts, if not all, of Eritrea in its domain and it certainly, most assuredly, absolutely had its own port, with the port people recognizing the authority of the king.
In contrast, they say, what does Eritrea have to counter this? A very artificial identity based on colonial rule (Italian! which included fascists!) and an armed struggle run by Arabs against Ethiopia (identity based on hatred of Ethiopia!) That is it. An identity formed by colonialists and fascists, sustained by Ethiopia’s eternal enemies, Arabs, waging war against Ethiopia. It is artificial and shallow!
Well, ok. Let’s go back to Mwalimu Nyerere. As late as 1962, he, too, considered an identity based on territorial map drawn by Europeans as “ethnographical and geographical nonsense”. He taught that it was “impossible to draw a line anywhere on the map of Africa which does not violate the history or future needs of the people.” But guess who, a few years later, in 1964, at the OAU meeting in Cairo, pushed forward an idea that only Morocco and Somalia did not support: that the African Union should respect the sanctity of colonial borders? None other than Nyerere. Why? Because in the intervening years he had heard from an American missionary telling him Maasai in Kenya should be part of Tanganyika. And from Dr Banda who told him Mozambique should be broken up to Nyasaland, Rhodesia and Swaziland. Recall that Mozambique had been a Portuguese colony for 400 years and here was somebody telling him as soon as the Portuguese are gone, it should be broken up and its components handed to neighboring countries. Let’s go back to pre-colonial times!
Yes, yes, yes, you say: but the same OAU recognized Ethiopia’s authority over Eritrea and it never recognized it as a post-colonial state. No, no, no, I say: that was AFTER Ethiopia had abrogated the Federal arrangement with Eritrea and annexed it in 1962, just in time for the OAU resolution. A Federal arrangement that was only the outcome of the Cold War and a US need for a listening post not too far from the Red Sea. Otherwise, Eritrea was not the only Italian colony: so was Libya, so was Somalia. It makes no sense for a country that has been colonized the longest, Eritrea–Italy’s first colony–to be “federated” while the other two former colonies, Libya and Somalia are declared independent states.
And what is this about Arabs supporting the Eritrean revolution? The United States and Israel, and later on the USSR and Cuba, and Yemen, and East Germany supported Ethiopia longer, and with significantly more materiel and financial and logistical and personnel, than the Arabs support for Eritrea. The Cubans literally led the war and fought in the Ogaden War and got a statue for it. Does that mean Ethiopian nationalism is dependent on outside forces?
“Artificial Nationalism”
What Ethiopians consider an insult–artificial nationalism–is actually the rule and not the exception in Africa. Unlike in Europe and in very few parts of Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Upper Volta, Burundi, and Rwanda) where the Nation (and thus Nationalism) came before the State, in the rest of Africa, first came the State then the Nation. So, Eritrea’s form of nationalism is typically African. It is what some scholars call the State-Nation instead of the Nation State. Even in those few parts of Africa that can claim to have been a nation before the Europeans arrived, it was an overlap and not an identical map: Ashanti, not Ghana; Fulta Jallon not Guinea; Mossi not Upper Volta, Abyssinia not Ethiopia, etc. “In short,” writes Philip D Curtin in Nationalism in Africa “the aspiration to create a state-nation from virtually nothing was stronger than the desire to base new states nations.” That is: Ghana chose to be Ghana and not Ashanti. Artificial!
A less judgmental way to call “artificial nationalism” is “territorial nationalism”: first comes the territory, then the awakening–the group consciousness–then the nationalism. What should matter is not the name or the type but the passion and sentiment it invokes. I don’t want to get into a contest here so I will just say Eritrean nationalism–“identity made into a collective passion”– is real: the average Eritrean loves his country as much as the average Ethiopian loves his country. Whether our wellspring is Adulisian civilization, Higi Endaba, Beja Kingdom, Ghedli or, like mine, good ol’ artificial African nationalism, it is a grave error to believe that generations of Eritreans got maimed, died, got exiled because they were tricked by Arabs or by their elite. It is real. As real as Ethiopia’s.
And this claim that Eritrea became Eritrea due to the mistakes of others–Menelik, Meles, the Arabs–is a terrible misreading of history, on top of being an insult to generations of Eritreans who labored for it. Eritrea didn’t hate Ethiopian rulers because they were Ethiopians; Eritrea hated them because they were oppressive rulers.
Pan Africanism
Muwalimu Nyerere was a terrible president but a great teacher and philosopher. And what he identified in 1962 remains true: “the existence of separate states in Africa is fraught with dangers from imperialist intrigues and of resurgence of colonialism even after the attainment of independence, unless there is unity among them.” Whether this is done by regional integration, confederation or any other arrangement that the stakeholders approve in a free and fair referendum, what matters is that we think in terms of voluntary convergence. There are 17 different ways to address Ethiopia’s–and all other landlocked nations–desire for a port, but the approach that Tamrat and Teodros are using (“It is mine and I will have it whether you like it or not”) is a 19th century colonial mindset, which can only invite endless conflict. It is not fitting a people of a great country who host the headquarters of the African Union and its Pan-African ideals.
In the end, in a big country with people allowed to express themselves perhaps for the first time in their history, a people emerging from an era of marginality and persecution, it should not be very surprising that such a blatantly aggressive viewpoint would be expressed. But we should not confuse the nuisance with the dangerous. What these two have to say is a nuisance; it becomes dangerous if Ethiopian policy makers take it seriously, specially at this time when the Isaias Afwerki regime is waging a deliberate campaign to depopulate Eritrea and to make national defense synonymous with conscription and serfdom. I have my theories why that is and I have shared them with you, but that’s a different story.
